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STATEMENT  ON  AFGHANISTAN  BY  E. C.  COMMISSION  PF.ESIDENT 
ROY  JENKINS 
Roy  Jenkins,  President of  the  EC  Commission,  told 
the European Parliament  last week  that the European 
Community  should not  allow  a  wedge  to be  driven 
between  the  United States  and itself.  President 
Jenkins outlined the EC's position  on  Afghanistan 
in  a  statement  to  the Parliament's Political Affairs 
Comm1ttee  in Brussels  on  January  31.  This  was  the  week 
following his visit to the  United States during which  he  met 
with President Carter,  Secretary of State Vance,  other 
members  of  the  US  Administration  and Congressional  leaders. 
The  text of President Jenkins'  statement  follows:-
''There  has been  agreement  in all institutions of  the  Community  and 
throughout  the Western world in  condemning the Soviet  takeover of 
Afghanistan.  I  do  not  therefore  think  that  I  need  to repeat  the 
almost  unanimous  views  which  we  hold  about  the events of  a  month 
ago.  The  European Parliament passed  an  impressively worded 
resolution on  the subject  which  I  know  from  my  own  visit to Washington 
prepared a  joyeuse entree  for  your President,  Madame  Veil,  a  few 
days  later. 
You  know  that at their first meeting after Christmas the Member 
States of  the  Community  on  15th January  issued  a  strong declaration 
condemning  the Soviet  intervention in Afghanistan.  This  was  unambiguous 
and  demonstrated  the  solidarity of  the  West  in general  and  the 
Community  in particular towards  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  Community  as  such  has  also wasted no  time  in reacting within its 
area of  competence.  Already  in  the first week  of January  the 
Commission  exercised its responsibility  for managing  the market,  in 
close consultation with  the Member  States,  by 
stopping the  food aid programme  for  Afghanistan  as  the  conditions 
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for its distribution to the population,  rather  than  to  the occupying 
forces,  could not be  guaranteed; 
- taking administrative action,  pending  confirmation,  which  was 
subsequently  forthcoming  by  the  Council,  to ensure  that  there is 
no  replacement  from  Community  stocks of agricultural products 
whose  export  to  the Soviet  Union  the United States had banned; 
- considering immediately  favourably  the  urgent  demand presented 
by  the  U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  for  immediate  aid 
for Afghan  refugees  in Pakistan. 
The  Commission  is proposing to the Member  States that  10  MUA  ($14.5 
million  )  should be set aside  for  this purpose. 
These  decisions  as  you  know  were  confirmed by  the  Council  of Ministers 
of  15  January,  who ·laid  down  the principle that the Community  would 
not  replace either directly or indirectly United States'  supplies 
for  the Soviet market.  The  Council  requested  the  Commission  to  take 
the  necessary  steps to ensure  the  implementation  of  this policy  and 
to propose measures  for other agricultural products,.while respecting 
traditional patterns of  trade. 
Let  me  now  turn in more  detail to the  action we  have  taken  in  the 
agricultural field.  I  make  two  preliminary points  : 
First,  we  must  bear in mind that in certain respects our situation 
is different  from  that of  the  U.S.  in agricultural  trade with  the 
Soviet  Union.  The  Americans  actually have  a  bilateral agreement  on 
grains,  and  they  export virtually  no  other agricultural products  to 
Russia.  For  them,  therefore,  the  benchmark is relatively simple: 
it is the  figure  of  8  million tons,  which  they  are  respecting.  We, 
on  the  other hand,  have  no bilateral agreement,  our exports  to  Russia 
include several different  crop  and  livestock products,  and  the  volume 
of  these exports  has  varied greatly over  recent years.  It is there-
fore  far  less  simple to  fix  a  benchmark  for our policy. 
Second,  theiBis  a  distinction to be  made  between  the mechanisms  for 
monitoring the  destinations of our  exports,  and  the  limits which  we 
wish  to put  to  our export to those  destinations.  The  first is a 
question  of  administrative practice,  and the second is  a  matter of 
political and  commercial  judgment. 
On  the administrative practices,  I  am  not  going to recite to you  a 
catalogue  of the different measures,  such  as  export certificates, 
prefixation of restitutions,  or adjudication,  that  we  have  adopted 
for  the different products. 3 
I  am  simply  going  to say  that  I  am  satisfied,  and  Finn  Gundelach 
(Vice President of  the  EC  Commission  with  responsibility  for 
agriculture  and  fisheries)  is satisfied,  that,  for all the products 
where it is necessary,  we  have  the necessary  instruments  to monitor 
exports  and if necessary  to keep  them within  limits.  We  shall keep 
these  administrative measures  under  review,  and  adapt  them as  the 
situation demands.  For  example,  this week  we  are  tightening  up 
the  milk products  system in various  ways.  There will  no  longer 
be  export  restitutions  for  fresh butter to  the  USSR,  but  a  system 
of export  tenders  for stockpile butter.  This will permit  us  to 
keep  a  strict control,  and in fact  we  anticipate  no  exports of butter 
to the Soviet  Union  in the near  future. 
On  the  targets at  which  we  are  aiming,  let me  recapitulate what  our 
recent  agricultural exports  to  the Soviet  Union  have  been.  I  limit 
this  to  the Soviet  Union  in order to simplify matters,  but it is 
obvious  that we  must  take  account  in our monitoring system of the 
other Eastern European  countries,  through  which  the Soviets might 
try  to obtain  additional supplies  from  us  indirectly.  I  also  leave 
out  the  year  1979,  for which  full statistics are  not  yet  available. 
For wheat,we  exported negligible quantities of  a  few  hundred  tonnes 
in  some  of  the  years  1974-78.  For  barley,  we  exported quantities 
varying  from  440  thousand  tonnes  in 1976  to  200  tonnes  in  1977. 
We  exported small quantities of other cereals,  such  as  rye  and maize, 
in  some  years.  We  supplied significant quantities of malt,  varying 
from  109,000  tonnes  in  1974  to  31,000  tonnes  in  1977.  -we-exported 
89,000  tonnes  of  beef in  1974,  but  less  in  subsequent  years.  Poultry 
has  varied  from  zero in  1975  to 62,000  tonnes  in 1977.  There were 
exports  of  2,000  tonnes  of butter in  1974,  49,000  tonnes  in  1977, 
21,000  tonnes  in  1978  (and 140,000  tonnes  is estimated for  1979). 
There  were  small quantitites of wine  in  1974-77  and rather more  in 
1978.  --
You  will see  from  the statistics which  I  have  quoted  that our  trade 
pattern with  the  USSR  has  been  highly erratic.  Indeed,  both  we  and 
the Americans  have  suffered commercially  from  the unreliable and 
unpredictable nature of Soviet  demand  for  these products.  It is 
not  therefore  useful  to pick out  a  figure  for  a  particular year,  or 
an  average  figure  for  a  period of years,  and  to say  that it represents 
the  traditional level or target to which  we  should adhere.  It will 
be  a  matter of  judgment  for  each product. 
What  I  will say is this.  Unless  and until  the  Soviet  aggression  in 
Afghanistan is ended,  our  exports  of  agricultural produce  to the 
USSR  will not  exceed what  we  judge  to be  traditional quantitites. 
In  no  case will there be  large export  deals  at special prices,  of 
the  type which  happened in  1973.  We  shall ensure  that sales are 
made  in  corttrolled quantities  and  at realistic prices. 4 
The  U.S.  Reaction 
As  you  know,  I  was  able  to visit the  United States last week  for 
talks with President Carter  and members  of  the Administration at 
a  time  when  the  Americans  are,already  considering  the  next steps 
in their reaction to Afghanistan.  I  am  happy  to be  able  to tell 
you  that  the  United States expressed satisfaction with  the action 
taken so  far by  the  Community,  particularly in the political and 
agricultural fields,  but  did express  the  hope  that  we  consider 
further steps,  notably  in  the field of  common  action  to  control 
the  granting of official export  credits  to  the Soviet Union.  This, 
the  Commission  and  the Council  are currently studying. 
The  United States  regards  the consequences  of  the  Soviet  invasion 
of Afghanistan  as  a  serious threat to world stability.  They 
naturally  look  to  the  European  Community  for political,  moral 
and practical support.  In Washington  I  was  able  to demonstrate 
that  the  Commission,  the Council  and  the Parliament  had offered 
a  clear demonstration  of Western  solidarity.  While  sharing the 
same  view  of  the  seriousness  of  the  Soviet  Union  action,  we  do 
nevertheless  have  a  slightly different point of  view when  it comes 
to the practical application of  some  aspects of our policy.  Just 
as  the  United States wishes  to  continue  arms  limitation talks with 
the Soviet Union,  so  do  we  wish  to pursue  detente  on  tolerable terms. 
What  we  need is  : 
Community  solidarity and  cohesion, 
not to allow  a  wedge  to be  driven between  the  Community  and  the 
United States, 
not  to let the Soviet Union  believe  things will  not  change but  to 
make  it clear that  economic  cooperation  depends  on  mutual  confidence, 
which  their action  has  undermined." 
*  * 
*  * 
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